presidential palace and appointed ministers and governors, all from his Islamist party. More troubling, the Northern Alliance opened the doors to Russian and Iranian advisers and intelligence operatives, who arrived in Kabul on a steady stream of air transports. Fahim, now the defense minister, garrisoned his forces in the capital and staffed the military high command exclusively with his political cronies and former Communist officers selected by his Russian allies.

Though international pressure forced the creation of a coalition government in late December, all of the powerful ministries—defense, interior, and foreign affairs—remained in the hands of the Northern Alliance. Qanooni, again the interior minister, and Fahim proceeded to use their power to harass political opponents, with several senior officials reportedly taking part in the assassination in January of a cabinet minister associated with the Rome group.

The Northern Alliance's winner-take-all approach threatens U.S. interests. First of all, the interim government has not been much help to U.S. forces against al-Qaeda in the south and east, where Pashtuns remember all too well the atrocities of the Rabbani government and seek to hold the new government at arm's length. Second, its Iranian allies have established two Hezbollah-style clandestine networks, Sepah-e-Mohammed and Sepah-e-Sahaba, to wage a campaign of Lebanon-style attacks designed to bog down the U.S. or even force it to withdraw. Third, Northern Alliance leaders have sought to delay or subvert the scheduled June meeting of the national assembly, or loya jirga, which is the key event in the planned transition to a more representative government. Fourth, if the dominance of the Northern Alliance persists, the Pashtuns (40–45 percent of the population) could rise up in a renewed civil war, and offer Pakistan's intelligence service an opportunity to reestablish its pernicious practice of supporting Taliban-style movements in Afghanistan.

The Bush administration must act carefully—but quickly. First, the U.S. must assert itself as the dominant foreign power in Afghanistan until the transition is completed (when elections take place in about two years). Bush has made excellent statements indicating that the U.S. will remain engaged over the long haul. In practical terms, this means that the U.S.—even as it moves on to other theaters—must retain sufficient strike power in the region to cow the Afghan factions. The U.S. also must check the roles of Russia and Iran. Although Bush encouraged Russia's President Putin to bolster the Northern Alliance as it fought to topple the Taliban, he must now explain to Putin that stability can only come from pluralism in an open political process—and that Moscow needs to rein in its client. The U.S. must also insist that the Afghan authorities cut off incoming flights from Iran.

Second, the U.S. must signal a shift away from its excessive reliance on the Northern Alliance. It should emphasize the need to pluralize Afghan politics and to distribute important cabinet seats more broadly: The stacking of ministries with Northern Alliance Appointees—often incompetent and in many cases illiterate—must not be allowed to stand. The coalition should further insist that—with the deployment of the International security assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul—Northern Alliance troops begin to be redeployed back to their native provinces. At the same time, the U.S. and its allies must try to level the playing field for the loya jirga. Russia and Iran have provided vast amounts of money to the Northern Alliance to buy political support; the U.S. should assist pro-Western parties, just as it did in Europe after World War II.

Third, the U.S. should insist that the loya jirga end the current imbalance of power favoring the Northern Alliance. We should also demand that every new minister be professionally qualified for his position and that no minister have a history of massive human-rights abuses. These criteria would preclude reappointment of Qanooni and Fahim, who were deeply involved in massacres in the early and mid 1990s. This step is essential to opening a new chapter in Afghanistan's troubled recent history.

Fourth, the U.S. should take the lead—but with the smallest possible footprint—in solving the security problem in Afghanistan. The ISAF should not be drawn into policing Afghanistan. If its mission expands geographically, a larger deployment—even one with as many as 20,000 additional troops—would be spread so thinly as to be militarily meaningless. The primary U.S. goal should be, rather, the creation of professional, nonpolitical, and ethnically balanced police and military services. This would require playing an intrusive role in rebuilding Afghan security services, similar to the one the U.S. played in El Salvador in the 1980s. Qualified Afghan personnel are available, at home and abroad, and many were not involved in factional politics during the 1990s. Even before the defeat of the Taliban, members of the Rome group had organized an association of former officers of the Afghan armed forces and police in anticipation of the need to rebuild the government; the U.S. should use these professionals to form core groups in each agency or service who would then recruit and train their subordinates and line officers.

Because of its poverty, Afghanistan should have a military limited to approximately 50,000 troops, though these forces must have sufficient mobility to deploy rapidly anywhere in the country. This limits the scope of the task of rebuilding the armed forces, and the process could readily be completed in two to three years. Only by creating such a professional military force can the U.S. have a local ally sufficiently able to hunt down remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda elements and preclude their return after the U.S. moves on to other theaters.

Fifth, the U.S. must be willing to fund the operations of the Afghan government—and particularly its police and military services—until its capacity to raise revenues has been reestablished. Providing sufficient pay for troops is crucial, because it enables the government to draw the best personnel away from factional armies, such as those of the Northern Alliance, and from regional warlords.

Together, these actions can, over time, secure a political outcome commensurate with the victory won by American arms last fall. But the adjustment in policy is badly needed. If we stay on the present course, the most likely outcome is a Northern Alliance-dominated government—a result that will leave Islamists like Rabbani in power, extend Iranian and Russian influence, and set the stage for renewed civil war when Pakistan eventually reengages in Afghanistan's politics. If the United States wisely recalibrates, it can establish a moderate and pro-Western state in Afghanistan, an outcome that will have a powerful and unmistakable demonstration effect for those who seek positive political change in the members of the Axis of Evil.

VOTE EXPLANATION

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to discuss my absence during the vote to table the Senate amendment No. 3419 offered by my colleague Senator LIEBERMAN. Although my vote would not have affected the outcome, I would have voted to table the amendment. The language in the legislation, which was also included in the Jordan Free Trade Agreement singed into law on September 28, 2001, is vital to ensuring that Congress preserves its exclusive right to establish and enforce U.S. labor and environmental standards.

During the vote I was attending a White House signing ceremony for H.R. 169, the Notification and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and Retaliation Act, ''No FEAR'' Act. I was the sponsor of this legislation in the Senate, S. 201—the Federal Employee Protection Act.

The press has referred to the No FEAR Act as ''the first civil rights bill of the new century.'' It significantly strengthens existing laws protecting Federal employees from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation for whistle blowing in the workplace. It is an unfortunate fact that too many federal employees are subjected to such treatment with alarming regularity.

I am pleased that President Bush has signed this important legislation and honored I was invited to the Oval Office for the signing ceremony. No FEAR will promote a more productive work environment by ensuring agencies enforce the laws intended to protect Federal employees.

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2001

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about hate crimes legislation I introduced with Senator KENNEDY in March of last year. The Local Law Enforcement Act of 2001 would add new categories to current hate crimes legislation sending a signal that violence of any kind is unacceptable in our society.

I would like to describe a terrible crime that occurred in January 1998 in Springfield, IL. A gay man was abducted, tortured, and robbed. The attacker, Thomas Goacher, 27, was charged with a hate crime, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and aggravated battery in connection with the incident.

I believe that government's first duty is to defend its citizens, to defend them against the harms that come out of hate. The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 is now a symbol that can become substance. I believe that by passing this legislation and changing current law, we can change hearts and minds as well.

COMMEMORATING MAY 15TH AS PEACE OFFICERS MEMORIAL DAY

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today more than 15,000 peace officers are expected to gather in Washington, D.C. to join with and honor the families of federal, state, and local officers who were killed in the line of duty.